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BUILDING THE NEW LIBYA:
LESSONS TO LEARN AND TO UNLEARN
ANN ELIZABETH MAYER*
1.

INTRODUCTION

Of the countries where existing political systems were upended
during 2011 in the course of the Arab Spring, Libya may have to
undergo the most difficult transition during the process of shifting
from dictatorship to the democracy with human rights protections
that so many revolutionaries aspired to see realized. It needs to
move beyond decades of arbitrary rule by Mu`ammar al-Qaddafi,
an eccentric despot who effectively dismantled all conventional
governmental institutions. In place of one man ruling by fiat,
Libya must establish the rule of law.
The shocking level of human rights violations to which Libyans
had become accustomed can be appreciated by viewing video
footage of the infamous 1984 show trial and public hanging of
Sadiq Hamed Shwehdi, a grotesque travesty of criminal justice. A
dissident who was arrested for anti-regime activity, Shwehdi was
subjected to a nationally televised show trial in a Benghazi
basketball stadium, during which he was seated cross-legged on
the stadium floor, his hands bound behind his back, looking
anguished as observers in the stands hooted and jeered.
Immediately after the “trial,” Shwehdi was hanged from the
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gallows that had been set up in the stadium.1 As Shwehdi dangled
from the gallows, a young woman, Huda Ben Amir, jumped up
and rushed to grab his legs, gleefully yanking his body downward.
She calculated rightly that her zeal would impress Qaddafi, and
she was subsequently rewarded with riches, winding up among
Libya’s pampered ruling elite. She served twice as the mayor of
Benghazi, a city notoriously hostile to Qaddafi, where her
monstrous deed had earned her the hatred of the population and
the sobriquet “Huda the Executioner.”2
Not only did the regime think it fit to televise Shwehdi’s
ordeal, but thousands of school children had been brought to the
stadium to observe the spectacle and to learn firsthand an indelible
lesson—that abject public humiliation and merciless savagery
should be meted out to political opponents. Questions about the
lasting impact of Shwehdi’s televised show trial and hanging are
linked to broader questions about the toxic legacy of more than
four decades of Qaddafi’s iron-fisted dictatorship, which involved
routine recourse to cruel torture, kidnappings, disappearances,
protracted incommunicado incarceration, and murders of Libyans
suspected of disloyalty. Were the mentalities of many Libyans
being so warped and coarsened by their regular exposure to
atrocities that they wound up thinking that recourse to lethal
vengeance was normal? Or, did revulsion at Qaddafi’s excesses
instill a determination to ensure a future when criminal justice
would adhere to international rules and when respect for human
rights would be secured? It is too soon to predict where things will
stand five years from Qaddafi’s overthrow, but in the immediate
aftermath of the revolution, one could identify developments
supporting both of these eventualities.

1 See Cameron Robertson et al., Libya Archive Reveals Pictorial History of
Gaddafi’s Brutal Reign, GUARDIAN, (July 18, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/video/2011/jul/18/libya-muammar-gaddafi (detailing the public hanging
of Sadiq Hamed Shwehdi, which took place after a show trial that included
“forced confessions” before a rowdy audience).
2 See Nick Meo, ‘Huda the Executioner’—Libya’s Devil in Female Form,
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 6, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8363587/Huda-the-executioner-Libyasdevil-in-female-form.html.
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CAUSES FOR WORRY

For anyone concerned to see the rule of law established after
Qaddafi’s overthrow, the manner of Qaddafi’s own death was an
ominous portent. Videos made from cell phones recorded his last
minutes after his capture by rebel forces on October 20, 2011.3
Young rebels fighting in the informal militias were shown
assaulting a dazed and disheveled Qaddafi after he was found
cowering in a large sewer pipe—a last minute attempt to escape in
a convoy from his Sirte hiding place having gone awry. The jerky
videos, in which what is happening to Qaddafi is often obscured
by those crowding around him, do prove that Qaddafi was
screamed at, repeatedly pummeled, and roughly dragged about.
Soon there was blood copiously streaming down the left side of his
head and onto his chest. With looks of terror and bewilderment
alternating on his countenance, he seemed to struggle to
understand what was happening to him. How he died is not
shown in the videos and remains uncertain.4 A subsequent
investigation by Human Rights Watch uncovered evidence of
brutal beatings and summary executions of captured members of
Qaddafi’s convoy, including his son Mu`tasim, but, on receiving
the NGO’s report, the Libyan authorities maintained that the
deaths were battle-related, which was indicative of their
disinclination to prosecute the perpetrators.5
Qaddafi’s corpse, showing bruises and wounds but with much
of the blood wiped away, was later placed on public display next
to that of his son for several days in a meat locker in Misrata, a city
where his regime was bitterly detested. Libyans formed long lines

3 See, e.g., RussiaToday, ‘We Need Him Alive!’ Earliest Graphic Video of Gaddafi
Capture, YOUTUBE (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZZzveRO6A&skipcontrinter=1 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (depicting the brutal
treatment of Qaddafi in the wake of his capture).
4 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEATH OF A DICTATOR: BLOODY VENGEANCE
IN SIRTE 28–29 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/libya1012webwcover_0.pdf (describing the militia fighters’ capture and
abuse of Qaddafi leading up to his death).
5 See id. at 46–47 (noting an inconsistency between evidence gathered by
Human Rights Watch and the Libyan authorities’ contention that Qaddafi, his
son, and a number of loyalists were killed during battle).
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to view the stinking, decomposing corpse.6 As others gaped and
gloated, a sober onlooker expressed well-founded misgivings: “On
the one hand, I celebrate this day, but the uncertainty is profound.
What has Gaddafi done to these people, these young boys who
killed him? They knew nothing else. But now they must learn
something else, another way, or we will never move on.”7
Qaddafi’s captors had a better option—turning their captive
over to the International Criminal Court (ICC). An obvious way of
strengthening the rule of law would be to enhance ties to
international law and international institutions such as the ICC. As
of October 2012, among the worrying signals that the road ahead
could be rocky, one could observe indications that powerful forces
in post-Qaddafi Libya were resisting collaboration with the ICC
and acting in ways that belied the frequent promises that human
rights would be respected in the new Libya. On June 27, 2011, the
ICC had issued an arrest warrant charging Qaddafi with
committing crimes against humanity. Had Qaddafi been put on
trial in The Hague, he finally would have had to confront in a
public forum the wide range of criminal offenses that he had
committed since the onset of the revolution. Had Libyans been
able to observe him being prosecuted for his crimes by judges
using international law, they could have seen a model to emulate
that could have provided lessons about the reforms that needed to
be instituted in Libya’s skeletal, shaky legal system. As it was,
Qaddafi’s extrajudicial execution and the undignified display of
his corpse inadvertently reinforced the idea that horrendous
brutality should be avenged by an equal measure of brutality, a
lesson that can only have nefarious consequences in the
circumstances of present day Libya, where lawlessness prevails in
many quarters and where groups that feel aggrieved over past
wrongs are eager to settle scores.
Unlike its neighbors, Egypt and Tunisia, where largely peaceful
mass protests led to the rapid overthrow of the local dictators,
Libya was wracked from February through October 2011 by
6 See Martin Chulov, Gaddafi’s Corpse Continues to Attract Impatient Misrata
Hordes, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2011, 2:47 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2011/oct/23/gaddafi-corpse-attracts-misrata-hordes (reporting on the crowds
that flocked to view Qaddafi’s corpse in Misrata).
7 Id.
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intense and destructive military battles that exacerbated
fissiparous tendencies, engendering new enmities and aggravating
tensions that Qaddafi had deliberately stirred up. Following a
policy of divide and rule, he had exploited historic rivalries,
strongly favoring some groups and regions at the expense of
others. After war broke out, tribes, regions, and communities
became polarized, as happened, for example, in the case of two
cities along the central coast—Sirte and Misrata. Sirte, a city on
which Qaddafi had lavished funding for ambitious projects,
remained a bastion of Qaddafi loyalists, and, despite fierce attacks,
it held out till the last week of warfare. Misrata, a city that did not
enjoy Qaddafi’s favor and had quickly sided with the rebels,
suffered extensive destruction and losses under lethal military
assaults carried out by Qaddafi loyalists. In the aftermath, the two
cities were left infected by mutual hatreds that could take a long
time to heal.8
In a troubling coda to Qaddafi’s murder, Omran Shaban, one of
the rebels who had apprehended him, was captured in July 2012
by men from Bani Walid, a stronghold of Qaddafi supporters. The
latter sought revenge by beating Shaban and repeatedly slashing
his chest with razors, inflicting grievous injuries that led to his
death.9 Shaban’s murder then provoked a military attack on Bani
Walid from his hometown, Misrata, which, in turn caused
denunciations and protests.10 Allowing such spirals of lethal
vengeance to continue could only lead to unremitting violence.
There was no army capable of curtailing the violence, because
Libya’s military had been deliberately enfeebled by Qaddafi due to
his fear of potential coups. He had relied on his security forces to
8 See generally Jon Donnison, Sirte and Misrata: A Tale of Two War-Torn Libyan
Cities, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Dec. 20, 2011, 6:57 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-16257289.
9 Gaddafi Captor Dies After Revenge Attack, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012.
10 Libyan Militias Shell Former Gaddafi Stronghold Town, REUTERS (Oct. 17,
2012, 2:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/17/us-libya-clashesidUSBRE89G1EE20121017; Kareem Fahim, Libyan Forces Now Control Restive Town,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/
world/africa/libyan-forces-now-control-bani-walid-officials-say.html (describing
the attack on Bani Walid, which resulted in many deaths and the wounding of
hundreds and prompted accusations that militias with governmental support had
been punishing the town for supporting Qaddafi).
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maintain his stranglehold on power. Once he was overthrown, his
security apparatus disintegrated, leaving no force that could exert
control over the disparate rebel militias that had sprung up to fight
Qaddafi, militias whose members seemed eager to utilize their
weaponry and who were not above indulging in wanton violence
and criminality.11 Their actions were not inhibited by concerns
about respecting human rights. Already in 2011, a number of
instances had come to light of militias exacting vengeance in a style
that suggested that they were copying Qaddafi’s methods.12 In
January 2012, credible reports surfaced of tortures being meted out
to detainees who were held by militias.13
As the months passed, militias kept acting as if they were
determined to prove that there were no forces that could stop them
from publicly flexing their muscles. The waves of criminality and
the manifestations of untrammeled power on the part of
intransigent militias seeking to advance their own agendas came to
See, e.g., Margaret Coker, Rival Militias Battle in Libyan Capital, WALL ST. J.,
Jan.
4,
2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203550304577138272815070632.html (discussing Libya’s need
for a central military command, the lack of which allowed a two hour street battle
in central Tripoli to escalate).
12 See, e.g., Libyan Rebels Detaining Thousands Illegally, Ban Ki-moon Reports,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
23,
2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/
nov/24/libya-illegal-detentions-un-report (stating that former Libyan rebels have
illegally detained thousands of people, while also engaging in revenge killings of
members of Libya’s Black African community); Daniel Williams, The Murder
Brigades of Misrata: Gadhafi’s Demise Was Just a Part of a Vast Revenge Killing Spree,
SALON, (Oct. 28, 2011, 8:00 AM) http://www.salon.com/2011/10/28/
the_murder_brigades_of_misrata/ (asserting that in their quest for vengeance,
Misrata brigades have “engaged in torture, pursed suspected enemies far and
wide, detained them and shot them in detention”); Libya: Apparent Execution of 53
Gaddafi Supporters, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/10/24/libya-apparent-execution-53-gaddafi-supporters
(“The
evidence suggests that some of the victims were shot while being held as
prisoners, when that part of Sirte was controlled by anti-Gaddafi brigades who
appear to act outside the control of the National Transitional Council.”).
13 See, e.g., Libyan Detainees Died After Torture, Human Rights Group Says, CNN
(Jan. 26, 2012, 11:19 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/26/world/
africa/libya-msf-torture/ (discussing the “widespread torture and ill-treatment of
suspected pro-Gadhafi fighters and loyalists” in Libya) (quoting Amnesty
International).
11
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pose serious threats.14 In this regard, Libya is in a dramatically
different position from that of post-revolutionary Egypt, where a
vastly bloated and well-entrenched military institution constitutes
a central obstacle to achieving true democratic reform. Lacking
any organized army or police force capable of managing the
worsening chaos, Libya essentially has the opposite problem.
Over the course of 2012, concerns mounted as Libyans
confronted the spreading lawlessness, which included incidents
that suggested that armed and well-organized terrorist cells were
making inroads.15 Disturbing signs of a breakdown in law and
order in Benghazi proliferated in 2012 as shadowy groups
repeatedly attacked international organizations and Western
targets. In April, a bomb was thrown at a convoy that included the
head of the U.N. mission to Libya, and in May, the Red Cross office
was hit with a rocket. The British abandoned their Benghazi
consulate after a diplomatic convoy was attacked in June. In
August a pipe bomb exploded in front of the U.S. consulate. Like
many other Muslim countries, Libya was swept by angry antiAmerican demonstrations in September 2012 in the wake of a
controversy stirred up over a trailer on YouTube for a film
produced in Los Angeles called “Innocence of Muslims.” Replete
with insults directed at the Prophet Muhammad that were
deliberately designed to outrage Muslims, the privately produced
film was widely blamed on the U.S. government, despite there
being absolutely no governmental connection. On September 11,
2012, a Benghazi mob that was protesting the film attacked the U.S.
consulate, and in the ensuing mayhem, an organized military
assault was launched on a nearby safe house where the visiting
U.S. ambassador Christopher Stevens had taken refuge, ending
with the death of the ambassador and three of his staff.16 Because
14 See, e.g., Borzou Daragahi, Libya: Armed and Dangerous, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2012, at 7 (explaining that members of disbanded militias refuse to relinquish their
weapons and warn that they will turn on the “nascent state” if their demands are
not met).
15 See, e.g., Borzou Daragahi, Libyan Armed Islamists Driven Underground, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2012, at 6 (examining the post-election culture of militia violence in
Libya and popular perceptions of this problem).
16 See
US Envoy Dies in Benghazi Consulate Attack, ALJAZEERA,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/09/20129112108737726.html
(last modified, Sept. 12, 2012); Harald Doornbos & Jenan Moussa, ‘Troubling’
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Libyans were typically grateful for U.S. assistance during the
revolution and because the ambassador himself was a popular
figure, the killings suggested that radical Islamist groups with ties
to terrorist networks could be targeting Western interests and
menacing Libya’s nascent democracy.
Another harmful outcome of the civil war was that racial
tensions were exacerbated. Qaddafi, who had arranged for himself
to be proclaimed the African “King of Kings,” was known for
courting popularity among Sub-Saharan African leaders by
dispensing generous financial subsidies and funding showcase
projects. He also invited Sub-Saharan Africans to resettle in Libya,
which was an attractive option for many of them, given Libya’s
relative affluence. As a result, Libya’s indigenous Black African
minority was swelled by hundreds of thousands of Sub-Saharan
African migrants. Once the revolution began, such migrants were
alleged to have fought on Qaddafi’s side in return for pay. Among
Libyans opposed to Qaddafi, a stereotype developed about proQaddafi forces being heavily manned by mercenaries of Black
African descent—both migrants and Libyans, a stereotype that led
to stigmatizing all Black Africans as enemies of the revolution.17
This mindset has prompted abuse of Black Africans—suggesting
that racial bigotry has gained ground.18 In the case of Tawergha, a
town populated by Black African Libyans, many of whom backed
Qaddafi, the inhabitants were terrorized and chased away by rebel
forces, leaving a ghost town, which was then vandalized.19 In a
Surveillance Before Benghazi Attack, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 1, 2012)
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/01/troubling_surveillance_
before_benghazi_attack (reporting on the discovery of important evidence weeks
after the attack that suggested that hostile forces had had the consulate under
surveillance, but asserting that conclusive proof of who was behind the attack was
still lacking).
17 See, e.g., Black Africans Come Under Fire in Libya, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/black-africans-come-under-fire-libya
(detailing the rise of racist attitudes in post-Qaddafi Libya through video clips
and social media postings).
18 See Libya: Stop Arbitrary Arrests of Black Africans, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 4,
2011),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/04/libya-stop-arbitrary-arrestsblack-africans (explaining that many migrant workers in Libya have recently been
detained because of their race and national origin).
19 Libya: Militias Terrorizing Residents of ‘Loyalist’ Town: Beatings, Shootings,
Deaths in Detention of Tawerghans, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 30, 2011),
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world where the infamous ethnic cleansings that transpired during
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia are a searing memory,
incidents of ethnic cleansing like the one in Tawergha highlight the
urgent need for concerted efforts to reconcile opposing factions.
Corruption constituted another peril. One consequence of
Qaddafi’s despotic system was the creation of a ruling elite that was
free of any accountability. In particular, members of Qaddafi’s own
family enjoyed flamboyantly lavish lifestyles, with several of his sons
becoming internationally notorious for their extravagant spending in
locales like St. Barts, London, Paris, Rome, and Venice. With no one
to control the Qaddafis’ greedy predations, Libya became a petri dish
in which corruption metastasized.
This led Transparency
International to give Libya a 168 ranking, placing it among the
world’s most corrupt countries.20 As Libya seeks to establish the
principle of accountability, essential for good governance, the task of
eradicating an ingrained culture of gross corruption looms large.
A further source of worry was that ambitious Islamist factions
were demanding to play a role in Libya’s government. Like their
counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia, Libya’s Islamists viewed the
demise of secular despotism as opening the door for them to
realize their vision of a society ruled by Islamic law. Libya’s
Islamists felt that they had earned a place in the new order, having
figured among Qaddafi’s most determined foes and having fought
vigorously on the rebels’ side. The most prominent Islamist was
the military commander Abdel Hakim Belhaj, who in November
2011 wound up as the head of the Tripoli Military Council. In a
published statement, Belhaj made it clear that Islamists would
demand to play a role in the new system, while also offering
assurances that they would abide by the rules of democracy.21
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/30/libya-militias-terrorizing-residentsloyalist-town.
20 See
2011
Corruption
Perceptions
Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/#CountryResults (last visited Nov.
7, 2012).
21 See Abdel Hakim Belhaj, The Revolution Belongs to All Libyans, Secular or Not,
Posted in Comment Is Free, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2011, 2:15 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/27/revolution-belongsto-all-libyans (describing the persecution and repression long endured by
Islamists who opposed Qaddafi and their contributions to the revolution, and
asserting their entitlement to be full participants in in a new democratic order).
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What the rise of Libyan Islamists to positions of power would
mean was open to speculation, because they include both
moderate and extremist factions. Nonetheless, past experiences
give reason to doubt the solidity of their commitment to
democratic freedoms. In those countries where Islamists have
gained control or have managed to dictate the political agendas,
this has led to decimating civil and political rights and a significant
deterioration in the rule of law as highly politicized versions of
Islamic law become treated as governing standards. The cases of
Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan illustrate how the ascendancy of
Islamism correlates with setbacks for democracy, the erosion of
freedoms of expression and religion, and severe curbs on the rights
of women.22 The fact that Islamist parties made a weak showing in
the July 2012 General National Congress elections gave the more
secular forces some breathing room. Nonetheless, Libyans had
reason to be anxious about whether Libya’s Islamists would accept
life under a basically secular system. By October 2012, Islamist
militias and spokesmen for the Islamist cause were expressing
anger over their inability to dictate policies and were becoming
more belligerent in their demands for implementing Islamic law.23
Ahmed Abu Khattala, a prominent Islamist leader who was widely
suspected of involvement in the attack that killed the U.S.
ambassador, stated in an interview that democracy violated
Islamic law and called Muslims who supported secular
constitutions “apostates,” while expressing contempt for
capabilities of the transitional government.24
3.

LIBYAN WOMEN’S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS MAKE WAVES BUT
ENCOUNTER RESISTANCE

Even without facing an Islamist takeover, Libyan women’s
struggle to achieve greater equality had to confront setbacks.
See generally ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION
POLITICS (5th ed. 2012) (discussing human rights schemes that utilize Islamic
criteria to weaken international human rights law).
23 See Daragahi, supra note 15, at 6 (discussing Libya’s chaotic postrevolutionary political climate).
24 David D. Kirkpatrick, Suspect in the Benghazi Attack, In Plain Sight, Scoffs at
the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/
world/africa/suspect-in-benghazi-attack-scoffs-at-us.html.
22

AND

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss2/4

05_MAYER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/18/2013 11:00 AM

BUILDING THE NEW LIBYA

375

Libya’s feminists initially felt empowered by the revolutionary
upheaval, which raised women’s hopes for an expansion of their
rights.25 They subsequently encountered indications that their
work would not be easy.
Libyans sympathetic to women’s aspirations to see
discriminatory laws rolled back were dismayed by an event on
October 29, 2011, when, in proclaiming the success of the Libyan
revolution, the head of the interim government, Mustafa Abdul
Jalil, endorsed a retrograde stance on polygamy. Instead of using
this historic occasion to promise Libyans that they would see a new
birth of freedom and an end to horrors like torture and execution
of dissidents, Jalil promised Libyan men that they could henceforth
take extra wives with no need to consult their existing wives,
repeating this announcement on the following day.26 In so doing,
he indicated that his priority was revising Libyan family law in the
direction of reinstating rules of medieval Islamic jurisprudence,
which gave men unfettered discretion to contract marriages with
up to four women at a time. Libya under Qaddafi had retained
laws restricting women’s rights, including various rules of
personal status that derived from Islamic law, but some reforms
had been undertaken. These included an attempt to mitigate the
harms of polygamy by imposing a requirement that, prior to
contracting marriage with an additional wife, the husband needed
to obtain the permission of his previous wife or wives.27 Abdul
25 See, e.g., Manal Omar, Women in Libya and the Arab Spring, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 4, 2011, 6:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/manalomar/arab-spring-libya-women_b_1076873.html (arguing for a greater role for
women in Libya’s post-conflict reconstruction); Kathryn Spellman-Poots, Women
in the New Libya: Challenges Ahead, OPENDEMOCRACY (Dec. 23, 2011),
http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/kathryn-spellman-poots/women-in-newlibya-challenges-ahead (assessing the trajectory of women’s rights in post-Qaddafi
Libya).
26 See Adam Nossiter, Hinting at an End to a Curb on Polygamy, Interim Libyan
Leader Stirs Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2011, at A8, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/30/world/africa/libyan-leaders-remark-favoring-polygamy-stirsanger.html (describing the reaction of Libyans to Mustafa Abdel-Jalil’s call for an
unrestricted right to take multiple wives).
27 See Alison Pargeter, Libya, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA: PROGRESS AMID RESISTANCE 11 (Sanja Kelly and Julia Breslin eds.,
2010), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_
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Jalil’s surprising decision to prioritize cancelling this modest
reform, possibly offered as a gesture to placate Islamists, made it
seem as if the enormous sacrifices of the revolution had been
incurred in order to ensure men’s right to take additional wives
with no regard for their existing wives’ interests and feelings.
In a breakthrough, an independent women’s conference was
held from November 11–15, 2011. Qaddafi had not allowed any
independent women’s rights NGOs to function, so this was a
welcome opportunity for Libyan women for the first time in
decades to discuss and set their own goals. Their support for
international law was unconditional.
Among their
recommendations were that Libya should ratify all international
human rights conventions, achieve the principle of gender equality
in rights and duties, amend existing laws to bring them in line with
international and regional conventions that prevent violence
against women and girls, fix a minimum forty percent quota for
women in politics, employ the media to change the stereotypical
image of women, and support programs on women’s reproductive
health and maternal and child care.28
It came as a disappointment that a women’s quota was
dropped from the electoral law that was drafted in January 2012.29
Nonetheless, women managed to win seventeen percent of the
seats in the July elections.30 This was enough to ensure that they
would have some voice in the legislature.
4.

CONFRONTING A LEGACY OF ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTIDEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY AND PSEUDO-HUMAN RIGHTS

To build up respect for the rule of law, Libyans will have to
undertake a strenuous ideological housecleaning, eradicating the
images/Libya.pdf (indicating that a man seeking a second wife must secure
judicial permission and obtain a written agreement of the first wife).
28 Libyan Women Want a Say in Running the New Libya, TRIPOLI POST (Nov. 19,
2011, 10:15 AM) http://tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=1&i=7321&archive=1.
29 See Bourzou Daragahi, Libya Drops Parliamentary Quota for Women, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012 (documenting a women’s rights activist’s disappointment that
the proposed quota was eliminated from the final draft of the electoral law).
30 Dominique Sogue, Libyan Elections Give Women a 17% Starting Point, WENEWS (July 18, 2012), http://womensenews.org/story/the-world/120719/libyanelections-give-women-17-starting-point.
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traces of Qaddafi’s Green Book, the tenets of which were constantly
extolled in the media and were also taught in educational
institutions as part of the official personality cult in which Qaddafi
was effectively held up as a kind of prophetic genius. As part of
his teachings, Qaddafi insistently denounced democracy as a fraud
and asserted that constitutions were meaningless in a state that
followed his philosophy, while extolling his own idiosyncratic
human rights charter, which was designed to accommodate a
policy of crushing all dissent. In the post-Qaddafi era, many
Libyans who remain imbued with Qaddafi’s ideology will require
reeducation to grasp what civil and political rights actually mean.
In the first years after Qaddafi seized power in 1969, Libyans
had lived under a rudimentary constitution. Constitutionalism
was repudiated in 1977 when the declaration of people’s power was
issued, inaugurating a so-called “state of the masses” that was
denoted by the Arabic neologism jamahiriyya. Thenceforth, Libyans
had to defer to the teachings of the Green Book, which purportedly
solved all the problems of government, economics, and society.31
According to Qaddafi’s Green Book theory, Libyans were to govern
themselves via an extensive network of committees and congresses,
obviating the need for a constitution or for any conventional
governmental institutions.32
In reality, these committees and
congresses were only window dressing; Qaddafi clung tightly to the
reins of power, reserving all-important decisions to his inner circle
and relying on strategies typical of police states to compel
acquiescence.33
See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, In Search of Sacred Law: The Meandering
Course of Qadhafi’s Legal Policy, in QADHAFI’S LIBYA 1969–1994, 113–37 (Dirk
Vandewalle ed., 1995); Hanspeter Mattes, Formal and Informal Authority in Libya
Since 1969, in LIBYA SINCE 1969: QADHAFI’S REVOLUTION REVISITED, 55, 56–62 (Dirk
Vandewalle ed., 2008) (analyzing the structure and institutions of Qaddafi’s
political system and the mechanisms wielded by the regime to secure power and
crush opponents).
32 Id. at 66–69 (explaining the role and structure of committees under the
Qaddafi regime).
33 See, e.g., Dirk Vandewalle, Libya’s Revolution in Perspective: 1969–2000, in
LIBYA SINCE 1969, supra note 31, at 9, 28–34 (describing strategies used by Qaddafi
to quell all resistance and dissent); Alison Pargeter, LIBYA: THE RISE AND FALL OF
QADDAFI 97 (2012) (recounting Qaddafi’s decision to create the Revolutionary
Committees Movement, a paramilitary body whose main purpose was to repress
dissidents and “destroy any organization that stands in the way.”) (citing
31
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The result was a society whose inhabitants were stripped of civil
and political rights, as indicated by the 2010 Index of Democracy
published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, which evaluates
countries based on electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the
functioning of government, political participation, and political
culture. It ranked Libya at 158 out of the 167 countries surveyed. On
a ten-point scale, Norway ranked at the top of the index with a score
of 9.80; Libya’s score was 1.94. Only a few countries ranked lower,
including North Korea, which ranked lowest at 167 and scored
1.08.34
As the potency of human rights ideals made itself felt, Qaddafi
found it essential to pretend that he, too, believed in human rights.
He obviously could not accept the rights set in international law,
which would enable his restive citizenry to stand up to his regime,
so he instead presented Libyans with his own twisted version of
human rights, which was tailored to ensure the ascendancy of his
ideology and to criminalize any dissent. The Great Green Charter of
Human Rights in the Era of the Masses was issued on June 12, 1988.35
Libyans were taught to treat this charter as the definitive statement of
human rights—even though it amounted to a kind of funhouse
distortion of human rights principles.
Reflecting Qaddafi’s insistence that Libyans uphold his Green
Book, Article 25 required all citizens to defend Qaddafi’s jamahiriyya
system unto death. Not surprisingly for a charter with such an
obvious political bias, basic civil and political rights were omitted.
For example, there was no freedom of conscience or religion, no right
of peaceful assembly, no freedom of expression or general principle
of freedom of association, no equal protection clause, no prohibition
of torture, no guarantee against arbitrary arrest and detention, no
protection against unreasonable searches, no presumption of
innocence for the accused, no guarantee against compelled
testimony, no right to legal assistance for the criminal accused, no
Hanspeter Mattes, The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees, in QADHAFI’S
LIBYA, supra note 31, at 93).
34 Economist Intelligence Unit, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2010: DEMOCRACY IN
RETREAT
(2010),
available at
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_
Index_2010_web.pdf.
35 See THE GREAT GREEN CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE JAMAHIRIYAN ERA
(1988), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3dda540f4.pdf.
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guarantee of a public trial, no right of appeal from court judgments
except where the death penalty was at stake, and no prohibition of
the imposition of penalties for acts not previously defined as criminal
in the text of a law.
The Green Charter included provisions that belonged in a penal
code, providing for criminal prosecutions for acts described in broad
terms that in the Libyan context could be used to criminalize dissent
and opposition. For example, Article 5 prohibited clandestine action,
violence, terrorism, and sabotage, with the admonition that any act of
hostility towards the jamahiriyya in connection with a foreign entity
was high treason. In outlawing monopoly or exploitation of religion
and stirring up sedition, tribalism, partisanship, factionalism, or
internecine fighting, Article 10 provided a basis for criminalizing a
variety of oppositional political activities. Article 26 prohibited any
act counter to the Charter principles. Taken together, these vaguely
worded provisions perversely offered a basis for relabeling
prosecutions for political offenses as measures to uphold human
rights.
Notwithstanding their being stuck with an educational system
in which studying Qaddafi’s ideas was a central task, many
Libyans had managed to gain an appreciation of what genuine
human rights involved, as indicated by the event that ignited the
revolution. Sparking the protests was the arrest of the human
rights attorney Fathi Terbil on February 15, 2011. At great risk to
himself, Terbil had sought to represent families of victims of the
notorious 1996 Abu Salim Prison massacre in which perhaps
twelve hundred prisoners had been slaughtered.36 That Libyans
rose in revolt in response to this incident proved that they
appreciated the courage of this defender of human rights. It was
therefore fair to say that anger over human rights violations was a
key factor in the outbreak of rebellion in Benghazi that quickly led
to uprisings in other areas.

See Sarah Boesveld, The Arab Awakening: The Beginning of the End for the
Gaddafi
Regime,
NAT’L
POST
(Dec.
19,
2011,
10:02
PM),
http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/12/19/the-arab-awakening-the-seeds-oflibyas-uprising-were-planted-long-before-the-arab-spring/
(describing
how
Terbil’s arrest prompted a protest that quickly mushroomed into a local uprising
that soon ignited a revolution).
36
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In Libya there is ample evidence of the popularity that human
rights ideals enjoy in the abstract, but to shut the door on an era of
gross human rights abuses, these ideals must now be transformed
into operational guidelines that are accepted and internalized as
the governing norms.
Meanwhile, events in 2012 like the
prolonged incommunicado captivity of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi
indicated that the Libyan legal system was falling grievously short
in terms of meeting the basic requirements of the rule of law.
5.

THE TROUBLING CASE OF SAIF AL-ISLAM QADDAFI

For those hoping to see Libya rapidly adjust to rigorous
adherence to international human rights law, the case of Saif alIslam Qaddafi raised red flags. It suggested that crass political
calculations were influencing the functioning of Libya’s postrevolutionary legal system.
As the revolution gained momentum in February 2011, Saif alIslam Qaddafi, the dictator’s oldest son and his likely successor,
tried to distance himself from the ills of Qaddafi’s system. The
ambitious Saif apparently calculated that, if he was to accede to
power, he had to pretend to share the popular rejection of the
status quo. He belatedly acknowledged Libyans’ aspirations for
freedom, democracy, and constitutionalism. Announcing that
major changes were in the offing and that the regime would make
concessions in these areas, Saif tried to co-opt the revolutionary
pressures. One could see this as a positive sign, indicating that
despite Qaddafi’s determined efforts to inculcate Libyans with his
anti-democratic and anti-constitutionalist philosophy, even his
own son and would-be heir had to recognize that the ideals of
freedom, democracy, and constitutionalism had enormous appeal.
Hoping to calm the revolutionary turmoil, in a televised
address on February 20, 2011, Saif spoke as if work on a
constitution would commence forthwith and as if a democratic
government would be inaugurated in which Libyans would enjoy
freedom, tacitly acknowledging that Libyans were fed up with the
jamahiriyya system. He further promised that “civilized” laws
would be adopted and that “silly” criminal penalties would be
discarded, effectively conceding that the legal system was in need
of reforms. Seeking to convince Libyans that their aspirations
could be promptly fulfilled without a revolution, he lectured:
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Today we are at a crossroads . . . We either tell ourselves,
“We are Libyans, and this is our country. We want . . .
freedom, democracy and real reform, this and that, and this
has been planned and agreed upon and was supposed to be
done at the forthcoming general congress assembly” . . . [or]
we will all seek the judgment of weapons. . . . So I tell you
that before we use weapons as a decider and we enter a
civil war and total chaos . . . tomorrow we conduct a
historic national initiative . . . to adopt a battery of laws
initially agreed upon: the press law, the civil society—
civilised laws, new laws . . . to widen freedoms, to cancel
many of the existing hindrances, the silly existing
punishments, and to initiate a national dialogue on a
Libyan constitution.37
The revolution continued to gather momentum in the wake of
Saif’s speech, making it glaringly obvious that Libyans did not
trust him to oversee the reforms for which they called. Saif had
made an accurate diagnosis of the grievances that had led Libyans
to revolt, but he lacked any credibility as a leader who would put
an end to the abuses of the Green Book era.
After Saif’s cynical attempt to co-opt the slogans of the
revolution failed, he elected to join the pro-regime militias engaged
in fighting to crush the rebellion. On November 19, 2011, Saif was
finally captured in the desert and brought to the western town of
Zintan. It was encouraging to observe the leader of the local
council proclaiming his wish to see Saif get a fair trial in Libya.
Presumably regretting the way Saif’s father had been abused and
killed after his capture, he offered a thoughtful assessment: “There
is no point to make a revolution for justice, and then you become
the same killers.”38
The fact that Saif was captured alive offered a precious
opportunity for Libya’s post-revolutionary leaders to compensate
37 Gaddafi Son: “We Will Eradicate Them All”, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2011, 4:25
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/gaddafi-son-muammarlibya.
38 Chris Stephen & Luke Harding, Gaddafi’s Intelligence Chief Captured in
Southern
Desert,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
20,
2011,
3:11
PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/20/gaddafi-son-pretendedcamel-herder.
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for the torment and murder of his father by ensuring that Saif was
treated according to the norms of international criminal justice and
was afforded a fair public trial for his alleged crimes. As it turned
out, the weak central government in Tripoli could not even
manage to wrest Saif from those holding him captive in Zintan,
who seemed determined to keep him incarcerated there as a
bargaining chip. As the months passed and Saif continued to be
confined in Zintan and denied access to an attorney or a judge,
indications mounted that the Libyan legal system was inadequate
to handle a case of this magnitude.39 Viewed in the abstract, the
idea of a Libyan court holding Saif accountable might have had
merit, but this did not take into account the aggravated chaos
afflicting Libya and the political tensions that were spilling over
into the functioning of the legal system.
Seemingly determined to downplay the manifest inadequacies
of Libya’s courts, Libyan authorities resisted making a
commitment to turn Saif over to the ICC, which had indicted him
for crimes against humanity. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC
could assert jurisdiction for reasons such as the Libyan system
having proved itself unable to carry out the proceedings or having
engaged in an unjustified delay.40 Under the circumstances, to
ensure that Saif’s protracted incarceration did not stretch out
indefinitely and culminate in a sham trial in which a verdict calling
for his death by hanging would be a foregone conclusion,
surrendering him to the ICC was the logical option.
A particularly troubling incident occurred in June 2012, when
Melinda Taylor, a lawyer from the ICC assigned to defend Saif,
was imprisoned in Zintan along with three of her colleagues after
visiting Saif on an official mission to discuss his defense. Libyan
officials indignantly accused her of committing crimes including
spying, and went on to threaten that the ICC delegation members
would be tried for their alleged crimes in proceedings from which
39 See Chris Stephen, Saif Gaddafi Sets Libya’s New Rulers a Test of Commitment
to Human Rights, GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2012/jan/07/saif-gaddafi-libya-human-rights.
40 See Libya: Q&A on the ICC and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan.
23,
2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/23/libya-qa-icc-and-saif-alislam-gaddafi (“[ICC] only steps in where national jurisdictions are unable or
unwilling to prosecute Rome Statute crimes . . . ‘at the earliest opportunity.’”).
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the defendants would be excluded. Under international pressures
to relent, the delegation’s Libyan captors eventually released them
after holding them for almost a month.41
This shocking
mishandling of a visit by an ICC delegation was a symptom of the
deficiencies of Libya’s system of transitional justice. Upon her
release, Taylor expressed her conviction that the treatment that she
and her colleagues endured, which included their detention
without being given any reason for their arrest and the confiscation
of confidential ICC documents, proved that her client Saif could
not get a fair trial in Libya.42
In yet another worrying development, it was announced in
September 2012 that Saif’s trial would be delayed for at least
another five months after the capture of Abdullah al-Senussi,
Qaddafi’s former spy chief—the pretext being that Senussi might
reveal information relevant for Saif’s prosecution.43 In this
connection it was not only outsiders who offered criticisms; the
head of the Libyan Council on Freedom and Human Rights
protested to reporters that the legal steps needed to ensure fair
treatment of suspects were being bypassed in what he called “an
exceptional justice system which lacks the basis of a fair trial.”44
The ICC also became a target of criticisms for failing to find a better
way to manage this awkward conflict.45
See Luke Harding & Julian Borger, Libya Frees International Criminal Court
Legal Team Accused of Spying, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2012, 2:26 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/02/libya-releases-icc-officials
(explaining the circumstances around the ICC delegation members’ release, which
the Libyan government characterized as a “humanitarian gesture”).
42 Julian Borger, ICC Lawyer: Saif al-Islam Gaddafi Will Not Get a Fair Trial in
Libya, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2012, 9:35 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/
jul/06/icc-lawyer-gaddafi-trial-libya.
43 Ali Shuaib, Gaddafi Son’s Libya Trial to be Delayed by Five Months: Official,
REUTERS, (Sept. 9, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
09/09/us-libya-saif-trial-idUSBRE8880F720120909.
44 Id.
45 See Mark Kersten, No Winners in ICC-Libya Standoff, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 8,
2012, 2:50 PM), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/08/no_
winners_in_icc_libya_standoff (proposing that the disputes over where to try Saif
and Senussi and the dissension within the ICC about how to handle the cases
could ultimately weaken the ICC and also undermine the pursuit of justice in
post-Qaddafi Libya).
41
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For those who hoped that Libya would leave behind Qaddafi’s
arbitrary and cruel mode of criminal justice, the way that Saif’s
case was mishandled was highly regrettable. Far from teaching
Libyans how criminal cases should be conducted, it suggested that
the mentalities of many important players in the public arena
remained mired in ways of thinking that reflected Qaddafi’s own
contempt for the law.
6.

GREEN SHOOTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN INHOSPITABLE SOIL

As indicated, observers of the Libyan scene had ample grounds
for concluding that the transition from Qaddafi’s despotism to a
sound democratic order was going to be difficult and that the
disregard for international human rights law that had
characterized the previous era was far from over. Nonetheless,
there were some factors that pointed in a positive direction.
One of the constructive steps that the Transitional National
Council took was to repudiate the lawlessness of the Qaddafi era
by quickly seizing the initiative while the war still raged to adopt
in August 2011 a Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional
Stage.46 This document indicated in the preamble that the new
order would break with Qaddafi’s dictatorship, stipulating that the
objectives included freedom, democracy, and justice; retrieving the
rights looted by the Qaddafi regime; and excluding “injustice,
tyranny, despotism, exploitation and dictatorship.”47 Article 7
provided that the state was to respect human rights and basic
freedoms and commit itself to joining international and regional
human rights declarations and charters. These positive elements
were countervailed by some problematic features, such as the
stipulation in Article 1 that Islamic law would be the main source
of legislation, which raised the possibility that Islamic criteria
could be used to nullify some human rights. Whatever its
shortcomings, the issuance of the draft constitution by itself
signaled a departure from the anti-constitutionalist policies of the
Qaddafi era.
See LIBYAN TRANSITIONAL NAT’L COUNCIL, DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER
TRANSITIONAL STAGE, Sept. 2011, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/4e80475b2.html (outlining fundamental democratic principles for
Libya’s transitional government).
47 Id. pmbl.
46
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The large Berber minority in western Libya, which may
constitute ten percent of the population, rejoiced at Qaddafi’s
downfall. He had insisted that all Libyans shared a common Arab
identity, compelling Berbers to acquiesce in the suppression of
their language and culture. When Qaddafi’s regime crumbled, the
Berber community quickly demanded cultural autonomy.48 It was
hard to predict how the Berbers’ demands would ultimately fare,
but the provision in Article 1 of the Draft Constitutional Charter
seemed to repudiate Qaddafi’s Arab chauvinism, recognizing
diversity by stipulating that the state should guarantee cultural
rights for all components of society and their languages.49
Constituting another promising development, the July 2012
elections to the General National Assembly were widely regarded
as free and fair, and resulted in a victory for centrist forces. The
well-regarded longstanding leader of the overseas opposition to
Qaddafi, Mohammed el-Megarif, was chosen as the country’s
interim president in August. Living as a fugitive for many years,
el-Megarif had written extensively on the evils of Qaddafi’s
regime.50 In October, the human rights lawyer Ali Zidan was
elected as the interim prime minister.51 Such leadership gives rise
to hopes that Libya stands a better chance of avoiding a repetition
of the abuses that blighted the country for decades.

48 See Alice Fordham, An Exuberant Awakening for Libya’s Berbers, WASH. POST
(Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/anexuberant-awakening-for-libyas-berbers/2011/11/11/gIQASov7NN_story.html
(describing the desire for official recognition of the culture and language of the
Amazigh people).
49 LIBYAN TRANSITIONAL NAT’L COUNCIL, supra note 46.
50 See Mohammed el-Megarif Elected as Libya’s Interim President, GUARDIAN
(Aug.
9,
2012,
8:08
PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
aug/10/mohammed-el-megarif-libya-president (detailing el-Megarif’s exile from
and subsequent return to Libya following the revolution, whereupon he
established a new political party and was ultimately able to win election as the
country’s interim president).
51 Mohamed Eljarh, New Prime Minister for Libya from the Liberal Bloc, MIDDLE
E.
ONLINE
(Oct.
16,
2012),
http://www.middle-east-online.com/
english/?id=54924.
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CONCLUSION

After joyously celebrating their liberation from a tyrant,
Libyans were obliged to cope with dangerous mayhem and
turmoil. In a setting where central state institutions were fragile,
the factionalism and violent actions of competing armed militias
that had emerged in the wake of the 2011 revolution constitute
major obstacles in the way of achieving a basic measure of security
and founding a healthy democratic order. Libya’s difficulties in
putting the civil war behind it and patching over bitter
antagonisms that were fostered by months of bloody conflict have
potentially broader significance. They augur ill for the future of
Syria, where a much longer war against the al-Assad dictatorship
has been intensifying hostilities between political factions,
ethnicities, and religious sects.
The period of more than four decades during which Libyans
suffered under Qaddafi’s thuggish dictatorship had provided them
with the opportunity to learn the hard way about the value of
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Unfortunately,
Qaddafi had bequeathed governmental and judicial institutions
that were mere shells, meaning that rebuilding Libya would
require effortful toil to erect the essentials for an effective
government and a well-functioning system of criminal justice.
Adding to the difficulties of a successful transition, decades of
living in the miasma of Qaddafi’s jamahiriyya had fostered
mindsets and behavior patterns that were at odds with respect for
human rights, and these would need to be unlearned. A sense of
the adjustment problems now facing Libyans can be gleaned from
the writing of the distinguished Libyan novelist Hisham Matar,
whose own life was scarred by Qaddafi’s terror apparatus. Matar’s
dissident father had figured among Qaddafi’s many victims,
having disappeared after being abducted by Libyan agents in
Egypt and imprisoned incommunicado in Libya. For long years
Matar remained obsessed with being reunited with his father, but
hopes that were initially raised after the revolution were dashed
when Mater learned that no trace of his father could be found. In
Matar’s 2006 semi-autobiographical novel In the Country of Men,
the reader encounters the perspectives of a young Libyan boy
whose dissident father is arrested and savagely tortured and
whose spirited mother succumbs to alcoholism as she seeks to
numb her sense of oppression. The boy’s childhood takes place in
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a setting where Qaddafi and his security apparatus are dominant
presences, where daily lives are pervaded by fear and
apprehension, and where people are haunted by visions of public
executions and tormented by the private betrayals that they
commit in desperate efforts to survive. The boy winds up with a
personality that is deformed by internalizing the pathologies of
Libyan society.
With Qaddafi removed from the scene, Matar recognized the
obstacles lying in the way of constructing a new vision of
citizenship in democratic Libya, which entailed adopting new
ways of thinking, but he refused to despair. He described the
momentous task facing his compatriots:
We are of course confronted with the most profound
challenge: how to build a democracy in a country whose
institutions and civil society have been strangled for 42
years. There will be setbacks, we will make mistakes, but
there is no other way to learn. We have defeated Gaddafi
on the battlefield, now we must defeat him in our
imagination. We must not allow his legacy to corrupt our
dream. Let’s keep focused on the true prize: unity,
democracy and the rule of law. Let’s not seek revenge; that
would diminish our future.52

52 Hisham Matar, Gaddafi Is Gone: Long Live Unity, Democracy and the Rule of
Law, Posted in Comment Is Free, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2011, 3:30 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/22/libya-gaddafi-tripolihisham-matar.
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